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Approaches to the interpretation of physical theories provide accounts of how physical
meaning accrues to the mathematical structure of a theory. According to many standard
approaches to interpretation, meaning relations are captured by maps from the mathemat-
ical structure of the theory to statements expressing its empirical content. In this paper I
argue that while such accounts adequately address meaning relations when exact models
are available or perturbation theory converges, they do not fare as well for models that
give rise to divergent perturbative expansions. Since truncations of divergent perturbative
expansions often play a critical role in establishing the empirical adequacy of a theory, this
is a serious deficiency. I show how to augment state-space semantics, a view developed
by Beth and van Fraassen, to capture perturbatively evaluated observables even in cases
where perturbation theory is divergent. This new semantics establishes a sense in which
the calculations that underwrite the empirical adequacy of a theory are both meaningful
and true, but requires departure from the assumption that physical meaning is captured
entirely by the exact models of a theory.
1. Introduction. Accounts of the interpretation of physical theories have
developed in conjunction with, and in several important cases are attendant
to, accounts of the structure of scientific theories. In other cases novel com-
mitments about interpretation are tacitly adopted in the work of those in-
terpreting particular physical theories. While there are significant differences
between the accounts, many share a common set of commitments. Ruetsche
has provided a helpful characterization of what is shared between the stan-
dard approaches. She explains that according to them, “. . . to interpret a
theory is to characterize the worlds possible according to it. These worlds
are (i) models (in something like the logician’s sense) of the theory, and (ii)
characterized as physical” (Ruetsche 2011, p. 7). Standard approaches to
interpretation consist in an account of how physical meaning accrues to the
mathematical structure of the theory.
Even amongst standard approaches, commitments about the second step
in Ruetsche’s schema are widely variegated. Some accounts explicitly take
the connection between mathematical structure and empirical content to be
a map of a particular sort, such as an isomorphism, a partial isomorphism,
or an embedding. On other accounts the connection is specified less formally
and consists of a metaphysical articulation of the structure of the worlds
picked out by the theory, with the mathematical structure functioning as
a guide. Commitments about the first step of Ruetsche’s schema are com-
paratively well-regimented. To specify the models of the theory, one must
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stipulate the states, dynamics, and kinematics characteristic of its structure.
Ruetsche’s caveat that these structures are models of the theory “in something
like the logician’s sense” is required because physicists are more permissive
about structure specification than logicians.1 Axiomatizations in mathemat-
ical physics typically are given in terms of the mathematical objects most
natural for the description of the domain in question, whether they be those
of differential geometry, functional analysis, or some other branch of math-
ematics.2 This is what differentiates axiomatically characterized models of
mathematical physics from the models of formal logical systems. Standard
interpreters all agree about the norms of structure specification in that they
all require models to exactly satisfy the dynamical equations of the theory,
or the axioms that characterize its content.
The aim of this article is to consider a different approach to structure
specification. Perturbation theory characterizes models as small deviations
from models whose structure can be characterized exactly. This technique is
used widely in physical practice, and sometimes it is resorted to as a matter
of calculational convenience. For this reason, it is not typically regarded by
philosophers as a method of structure specification, but instead as a useful
approximation scheme for extracting numerical predictions from exact mod-
els. However, in a number of important cases including quantum field theory
and string theory, the best available characterization of the structure of em-
pirically adequate models is provided by perturbation theory. This creates
tension with the norms of structure specification accepted by standard inter-
preters because in these cases no exact model is available. The absence of
an exact model results from the fact that resorting to perturbation theory
often results in divergence. The approximation does not converge to a new
exact model. For this reason it is not clear how to apply standard accounts
of interpretation to empirically adequate models of quantum field theory. In
face of this problem it is typically assumed, though often only tacitly, that
there is some exact divergence-free structure to which we currently do not
have access lying behind the success of the theory. On this view, structures
satisfying the standard interpreters’ norms of structure specification are sup-
posed to underly the empirical success and physical meaningfulness of the
theory.
This article pursues a different response to the divergences of perturbation
theory. I argue that perturbation theory should not be regarded as an approx-
1(L. Ruetsche, personal communication, 18 September 2016)
2For example, triples 〈M,Tab, Gab〉 that exactly satisfy the Einstein field equations are
models of general relativity, and the collection of n-point functions for the φ42 field theory
is a model of quantum field theory because they can be shown to exactly satisfy the the
Wightman axioms.
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imation scheme, but instead that it provides a novel connection between the
mathematical structure of a theory and its empirical content. The strategy I
pursue to argue for this claim is to fix on one explicitly articulated approach
to interpretation, the state-space semantics view developed by Beth and van
Fraassen.3 I argue that state-space semantics exemplifies Ruetsche’s charac-
terization of the standard approach to interpretation. While focusing on one
particular approach to interpretation limits the generality of the conclusions
established, state-space semantics exhibits a core feature of most standard
accounts by taking meaning relations to derive from the existence of maps
from the exact structure of the theory to statements expressing its empirical
content. I argue that while state-space semantics adequately captures cases in
which perturbation is convergent, it fails to adequately capture the empirical
success resulting from truncations of a large class of divergent perturbative
expansions.4 I show that this class cannot be interpreted as an approximation
to an exact model. This observation motivates taking seriously the idea that
the empirical content of a theory can have limited precision, that is, that em-
pirical content can be inexact. I provide an alternative semantics that does
capture the empirical success of truncated divergent expansions by articulat-
ing principled limits on their precision. Exact models play a privileged role
in attributions of physical meaning to the mathematical structure of theories
in standard approaches to interpretation. This has had the adverse effect of
preventing physical meaning from accruing to empirically adequate models
of quantum field theory. I provide an alternative approach to interpretation
which allows for meaningful attributions of physical content to the models of
the theory that actually make contact with the world.
The argument proceeds as follows. In the second section I consider an ex-
ample of divergent perturbation theory in quantum field theory. I then review
the necessary elements of the mathematical theory of divergent perturbative
expansions. In the third section I argue that state-space semantics adequately
captures the case in which perturbation theory yields convergent expansions
for observables, but fails to do so for divergent perturbation theory. While
truncations of convergent expansions can naturally be interpreted as approx-
imations, the same is not true of divergent expansions. The aim is not to
demonstrate a deficiency of state-space semantics in particular. Rather, its
role in the argument is simply to provide a concrete target which is explic-
itly formulated. The assumptions it adopts are also adopted in many other
prominent approaches to the attribution of physical meaning to mathemat-
ically expressed theories. As such, the criticism I provide of state-space se-
3(Beth 1960; van Fraassen 1970)
4A truncation of an infinite expansion is the sum of a finite initial segment of the series.
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mantics in this article applies to many standard accounts.5 The third section
also illustrates the limitations of state-space semantics using examples from
classical mechanics and non-relativistic quantum mechanics.6 These are cases
in which truncations of divergent perturbative expansions have been an im-
portant factor in establishing the empirical adequacy of a theory. Such cases
require a semantics different from state-space semantics and I provide such an
alternative in Section Four. The final section concludes by emphasizing that
dismissing divergent perturbation theory as merely an approximation scheme
has the pernicious effect of divorcing physical meaning from empirically ade-
quate models of quantum field theory.
2. The divergence of perturbation theory. Perturbation theory is the
predominant method for deriving empirical information from physical theo-
ries.7 Suppose one wants to evaluate an expression in a theory involving a
function, f(x), whose exact structure is not necessarily known.8 The function
can be perturbatively evaluated by substituting f(x)→∑∞n=0 cnxn. For this
procedure to be effective, x must be a small parameter describing a deviation
from a model that can be characterized exactly. Perturbation theory con-
verges if the sequence of partial sums SN =
∑N
n=0 cnx
n converges to a finite
limit, that is, limN→∞ SN <∞. Of course, if the limit exists it is unique and
so when perturbation theory converges it uniquely determines the exact value
of the function it is being used to characterize. Perturbation theory is said to
diverge if the sequence of partial sums diverges, that is, limN→∞ SN =∞. In
either case, the series can be truncated at some order N , and early terms in
the series can be summed,
∑N
n=0 cnx
n, to give a finite estimate of the value
of the function.
While convergent expansions are considered mathematically well-understood,
divergent expansions have widely been regarded with suspicion since their dis-
covery. This suspicion is often motivated by appeal to the following remark
of Abel: “Divergent series are the invention of the devil, and it is shameful
to base on them any demonstration whatsoever . . . ” (Abel and Holmboe
1839). This section addresses how convergent and divergent perturbation
theory differ as attempts to specify the structure of a theory.
5The details of the argument for that claim will be left to future work.
6The large-order divergences I am concerned with have mistakenly been thought to be a
special feature of quantum field theory. The argument is actually applicable to a wide
variety of physical theories.
7Comparatively little philosophical attention has been dedicated to this method. Noteable
exceptions include (Batterman 1997; Batterman 2002; Batterman 2007).
8The object being perturbatively evaluated need not be a function. Whether it is a function,
an eigenvalue, an S-matrix element, an n-point function, or some other structure, the
discussion below applies equally well.
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Before turning directly to this task, it is instructive to consider the fol-
lowing example. The magnetic moment of the electron, g, is a property of
electrons when they are exposed to an external magnetic field. Its value ac-
cording to the Dirac equation, which treats electrons as relativistic particles,
is exactly 2. In 1947, experimental evidence revealed that the value of g devi-
ated just slightly from this exact value.9 This evidence motivated physicists
to search for a theoretical prediction of the anomalous magnetic moment of
the electron, ae = (g−2)/2. The value of this observable can be calculated in
quantum electrodynamics, a perturbatively characterized model of quantum
field theory. Schwinger calculated the first term in the perturbative expan-
sion which generated a value that correctly predicted the value of ae within
experimental error.10 This successful empirical prediction played a critical
role in convincing physicists to pursue relativistic quantum field theory as
the framework for describing elementary particle physics.11 It is important
to note that what provided the theoretical prediction in this case was the
truncation of an infinite perturbative expansion at its very first term.
The calculation of terms beyond the first order of perturbation theory
becomes increasingly difficult.12 The anomalous electron magnetic moment
continues to function as a precision test of quantum electrodynamics and
the Standard Model of particle physics, and so considerable effort has been
dedicated to calculating additional orders.13 The difficulty of the calculation
is so great that the current state of the art only allows for the determination
of five orders.14 When these five terms are summed and compared to the
experimentally measured value one finds that:
ae (theory) = 0.001159652180(73)
15
ae (experiment) = 0.001159652181(78).
16
Agreement between theory and experiment to ten decimal places is an indi-
cation that the theory gets something about the world profoundly correct.
9(Kusch and Foley 1947)
10(Schwinger 1948; Schwinger 1949)
11The history of the role of this calculation in demonstrating the empirical adequacy of
quantum electrodynamics is recounted in detail in (Schweber 1994).
12This is the case because the number of Feynman graphs contributing to an individual
order grows approximately factorially in the order. The complexity of the integral cor-
responding to each graph also grows with the order.
13(Kinoshita 2014)
14More specifically, it is fifth-order in the fine structure constant which is proportional to
the square of the coupling, so it is tenth-order in the coupling.
15(Aoyama, Hayakawa, Kinoshita, and Nio 2012)
16(Hanneke, Fogwell, and Gabrielse 2008)
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This agreement is often cited as evidence that quantum electrodynamics is
the most empirically successful physical theory ever created, and for good
reason. Feynman famously explained that the success of this calculation is
tantamount to theoretically determining the distance between Los Angeles
and New York to the width of a human hair (Feynman 1985, p. 7).
There is, however, a serious problem lurking in the background. There
are compelling arguments going back to (Dyson 1952) that suggest that the
perturbative calculation diverges if summed to all orders.17 This means that
as additional orders of perturbation theory are added to the sum, eventu-
ally the theoretical prediction will not only deviate from the experimentally
determined value, but it will become infinite. The theory, it seems, is not em-
pirically adequate at all: it is infinitely wrong about the value of ae. Abel’s
caution about using such series thus seems to have been warranted. Trusting
truncations of divergent series at low orders seems to lead to serious errors. In
fact, immediately following his cautionary note, Abel remarks that: “. . . That
most of these things [truncation of divergent series] are correct, in spite of
that, is extraordinarily surprising. I am trying to find a reason for this; it
is an exceedingly interesting question” (Abel and Holmboe 1839). The sense
in which the truncations work is that the sum of the low orders of divergent
perturbation theory often yield values in close agreement with empirically
determined values. In the century following Abel’s remarks, mathematicians
developed a completely rigorous theory of divergent expansions. While this
mathematical theory provides many critical pieces of the explanation of their
empirical success, below I argue there is an additional philosophical problem
which needs to be resolved in order to understand how they hold empirical
content.
When divergent perturbation theory is empirically successful, it is usually
an indication that the perturbative series in question is asymptotic to some
exact structure.18 A function f(x) is asymptotic to the series
∑∞
n=0 anx
n,
f(x) ∼∑∞n=0 anxn, as x→ 0 if and only if for every fixed N ,
lim
x→0
f(x)−∑Nn=0 anxn
xN
= 0.
Asymptoticity is a condition that requires that the difference between the ex-
act value of the function and the partial sum of the series that is asymptotic
17In particular, the arguments suggest that it diverges even after regularization and renor-
malization techniques are employed to render every individual term of the series finite.
This additional complication is discussed in more detail in Section 4.
18This explanation of the success of the anomalous electron magnetic moment calculation
was offered by Dyson immediately upon arguing for the divergence of the calculation
(Dyson 1952).
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to it is appropriately small, but not necessarily zero, for every order of per-
turbation theory. This is a different type of condition than the one required
for convergence to the exact value of a function. Convergence requires that in
the limit where all orders of perturbation theory are included, the difference
between the partial sums of the series and the exact value of the function
becomes exactly zero.
The order-by-order representation of the function provided by an asymp-
totic series exhibits qualitatively different behavior from that provided by a
convergent series. When a series is convergent to a function, typically the first
few partial sums give a rather poor approximation to the function. As addi-
tional orders are included, the approximation eventually become better, and
as the series is convergent, in the limit where all of the terms are included the
approximation becomes an exact representation of the function. Asymptotic
series behave differently. Their first few partial sums typically give very close
agreement with the exact value of the function. However, when additional
orders are included eventually the partial sums begin to exhibit increasingly
poor agreement with the exact value. In the limit where all of the terms are
included, since the asymptotic series is typically divergent, it gives a value
that is infinitely different from the exact value. This is precisely the behavior
of the series representation of the anomalous electron magnetic moment. It is
in this sense that the conjecture that the first few partial sums come from an
asymptotic series explains the empirical success of the ultimately divergent
expansion.
The effectiveness of the truncation of a convergent expansion at approx-
imating a function is accounted for by the fact that the expansion uniquely
determines the function when summed to all orders. It is natural to wonder
if asymptotic expansions similarly constrain the exact structure lying be-
hind their success. To answer this question, the first relevant observation to
make is that each function has a unique asymptotic expansion: if the limit in
the definition of asymptoticity exists, it follows immediately that it is unique.
However, two different functions can have the same asymptotic expansion. To
see why this is the case, consider f(x) = e−1/x for x > 0. Then f(x) ·x−N → 0
as x → 0, so f(x) is asymptotic to the series that has all zero coefficients.
It follows that f(x) can be added to another function g(x) with non-trivial
asymptotic expansion to generate a new function h(x) = f(x) + g(x), which
has the same non-trivial asymptotic expansion as g(x). Repeated application
of this argument can, of course, generate an infinite collection of functions
which do not agree on their exact value anywhere, but which all share the
same asymptotic expansion. Thus, the conjecture that a perturbative ex-
pansion is asymptotic to an exact structure does not uniquely specify what
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structure that happens to be.
Fortunately, there is a condition stronger than that the series is asymptotic
to the function, but weaker than that the series is convergent, that does
determine the function uniquely. This is the strong asymptotic condition. A
function f(z), which is analytic in a sector of the complex plane,
S = {z | 0 < |z| < B; | arg z| < 1
2
pi + },
is said to obey the strong asymptotic condition and have
∑∞
n=0 anz
n as its
strong asymptotic series if there exist C and σ such that,∣∣∣∣∣f(z)−
N∑
n=0
anz
n
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ CσN+1(N + 1)!|z|N+1,
for all N and z ∈ S.19 Strong asymptoticity, like asymptoticity, is a con-
dition that requires the differences between the exact value of the function
and its series representation be appropriately small for every order of pertur-
bation theory. This condition is important because if
∑∞
n=0 anz
n is a strong
asymptotic series for analytic functions f(z) and g(z) in a sector S, it follows
that f(z) = g(z) for all z ∈ S. The strong asymptotic series of a function
uniquely determines the function, just as a convergent series does. If one
knows the strong asymptotic series of a function, then the function can be
uniquely reconstructed by Borel summation. Suppose that
∑∞
n=0 anz
n is a
strong asymptotic series for f(z) in the sector S, as defined above. The Borel
transform,
g(z′) =
∞∑
n=0
an
n!
z′n,
can be used to produce the unique reconstruction of f(z) from its strong
asymptotic series, because for all z such that |z| < B and | arg z| < ,
f(z) =
∫ ∞
0
g(z′z)e−z
′
dz′.
A series is Borel summable if and only if it is strongly asymptotic to a func-
tion. When a series is Borel summable in this manner, the series uniquely
determines the function just as in the case of convergent expansions.
These results are of central importance for assessing the extent to which
structure specification is possible using perturbation theory. When perturba-
19Discussion of the origin of the motivation for this bound can be found in (Reed and
Simon 1978).
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tion theory is convergent, the perturbative expansion provides what is nec-
essary for exact structure specification. The discussion of this section shows
that when perturbation theory diverges, this question is more subtle. If the
series resulting from the perturbative characterization of a model satisfies the
strong asymptotic condition, the series suffices to exactly specify the struc-
ture of the theory. One is naturally led to wonder whether all instances of
empirically successful truncations of divergent perturbation theory, including
the calculation of ae, can be explained using this fact. If the strong asymp-
totic condition is not satisfied, the series by itself does not suffice to pin down
the exact structure of the theory. If this is the case for the expansion for ae,
it is not at all clear what the truncated series tells us about the exact model
underwriting this empirically successful calculation.
3. State-space semantics. State-space semantics, a view due to Beth
and van Fraassen, exemplifies the standard account of how mathematical
structure supports the meaning of physical claims.20 This section investigates
whether or not state-space semantics adequately captures the truth conditions
for models that are characterized perturbatively. I show that the answer
is negative in the case of models that are not Borel-summable. It should
be noted though that this is not intended as a critique of only state-space
semantics. My aim is to make plausible that a similar problem faces all
approaches to interpretation that rely on a map from an exact mathematical
structure to empirical content. The role of state-space semantics is simply to
provide a concrete proposal in which exact and perturbative models can be
directly compared.
The semantics consists of three ingredients; a state-space, a collection of
elementary physical statements, and a satisfaction function. Many physi-
cal theories introduce an abstract mathematical state-space, S, to represent
physical quantities in space and time. Models of the theory are trajectories in
the state-space that exactly satisfy the syntactic expression of the dynamical
equations of the theory. The elementary physical statements are a collection
of sentences, U(m, r, t), expressing the empirical content of the theory. Each
U(m, r, t) ascribes a physical magnitude, m, a definite value, r, at a specific
time, t. The truth values of the U(m, r, t) depend on the state of the actual
physical system being represented. This dependence is captured by a map
h, the satisfaction function, which connects the mathematical model to the
20The view is introduced and discussed in (Beth 1960; van Fraassen 1967; van Fraassen
1970; Arntzenius 1991). Debates concerning the semantics of scientific theories in general
have largely been supplanted by debates about the interpretation of particular theories,
but as I noted, van Fraassen’s state-space semantics view exemplifies Ruetsche’s charac-
terization of the standard approach to interpretation.
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expression of the empirical content of the theory. van Fraassen explains that:
“For each elementary statement U there is a region h(U) of the state-space
[S] such that U is true if and only if the system’s actual state is represented
by an element of h(U)” (van Fraassen 1970, p. 328).21 The system’s actual
state is represented by U if measurement of the quantity m at time t would
yield precisely the value r ascribed to it by U . In other words, if measure-
ment would yield a value, r¯, the satisfaction function is the one that assigns
“true” to those U(m; r; t) with r = r¯ and “false” to the others. The region
h(U) is the collection of states that yield r = r¯. Note that this abstract
characterization of the semantics straightforwardly exemplifies both stages
of Ruetsche’s account of standard approaches to interpretation. Structure
specification consists of fixing on the trajectories in state-space that exactly
satisfy the relevant dynamical equations of motion, and the kinematic con-
straints. The characterization of the models as physical occurs through a
rule connecting statements expressing the empirical content of the theory to
states of the system represented in state-space.
Applying this abstract characterization of the semantics to a particu-
lar theory requires choosing the appropriate state-space, elementary physical
statements, and satisfaction function for the theory in question. To represent
the motions of masses interacting through forces, classical mechanics employs
an abstract state-space which encodes the positions, qk = (qx, qy, qz), and mo-
menta, pk = (px, py, pz), of each mass. The state-space is thus R6n for n the
number of masses. The dynamics of the theory are defined by a Hamiltonian,
H, which expresses the nature of the interaction between the masses. Models
of the theory are trajectories in state-space that exactly satisfy the canonical
equations of motion:
dqk
dt
=
∂H
∂pk
dpk
dt
= −∂H
∂qk
.
All of the physical observables described by the theory are functions of the
qk and pk. The elementary physical statements ascribe values to these ob-
servables. For example, one particular U(m, r, t) is the sentence ascribing to
a particular physical mass a particular position in space at a particular time.
The satisfaction function is the one that assigns “true” to those states in
state-space that yield that exact value at the appropriate time, and “false”
to the other states.
This semantics adequately captures truth conditions for truncations of
convergent perturbation theory. Consider a classical mechanical system of
two masses interacting gravitationally. In this case an exact solution to the
21I have changed van Fraassen’s notation for the state-space to avoid confusion below.
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dynamical equations of the theory can be found, and state-space semantics
can be straightforwardly applied. Moreover, perturbative treatment of such
models yields convergent expansions whose limits agree by necessity with the
exact solutions to the dynamical equations. This makes it possible to treat
truncations of the series representation of the exact solutions as approxima-
tions to those solutions. For my purposes, a mathematical object O1, can
be treated as an approximation of another mathematical object O2 if O1 is
appropriately close to O2 in some sense that is appropriate for the context. It
is a relation that obtains between two mathematical objects, independent of
their physical interpretation.22 When the objects in question are a function
and a truncation of a series representation of that function, a measure of the
relevant notion of closeness is given by |f(x) −∑Nn=0 anxn|. Truncations of
perturbative expansions for solutions of two-body gravitational systems are
approximations of the exact solutions that they converge to when summed
to all orders. When they are interpreted as approximations, the empirical
success of such truncations is accounted for by state-space semantics. The
exactly true physical claim with respect to the semantics is the one generated
by the mapping from the exact solution. The numerical value provided by the
truncation of the perturbative expansion approximates this exact numerical
value, and the empirical content of this truncation is underwritten by the
exact solution.
More, as usual, is different. When an additional mass is added to the
system being represented, an exact solution to the dynamical equations for
all time is not currently available. Under certain conditions, the existence
of an exact solution can be shown to exist, but its exact form has not been
explicitly constructed.23 This is an obstacle to the application of state-space
22There exists a vast literature on approximation and idealization which does not always
carefully distinguish between the terms. (McMullin 1985) provides an account of many
of the relevant distinctions. The notion of approximation I employ agrees with the
one articulated in (Norton 2012). It also agrees with the one articulated by Frigg and
Hartmann, who hold up truncations of series expansions as a paradigmatic example of
approximation: “One mathematical item is an approximation of another one if it is
close to it in some relevant sense. What this item is may vary. Sometimes we want to
approximate one curve with another one. This happens when we expand a function into
a power series and only keep the first two or three terms. . . . The salient point is that
the issue of physical interpretation need not arise. Unlike Galilean idealization, which
involves a distortion of a real system, approximation is a purely formal matter.” (Frigg
and Hartmann 2012).
23This is an over-simplification. No closed form analytic solution is available, but Sund-
man was able to construct an exact solution in terms of convergent infinite series. For
discussion of Sundman’s results see (Barrow-Green 2010; Saari 1990; Siegel 1941). I am
grateful to Gordon Belot for bringing this work to my attention. Unfortunately, Sund-
man’s solution requires far too many terms to generate sufficient accuracy to be of any
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semantics: in the absence of an explicitly constructed exact solution, it is not
possible to explicitly construct a satisfaction function to connect the mathe-
matical structure of the theory with its empirical content. This is not a mere
mathematical curiosity, but rather a critical problem of physical practice.
Three-body gravitational systems such as the Sun, Earth, and Moon, and
the Sun, Saturn, and Jupiter played an important role in investigations of ce-
lestial mechanics in the 19th century. In the absence of explicitly constructed
exact solutions, the perturbative treatment of the three-body problem took
on a role of increased importance. It was the only method available to gen-
erate numerical information to compare with the available empirical data.
The addition of the third mass can be treated as a perturbation of the ex-
act solution for two gravitating bodies. Perturbative evaluation of the first
few partial sums for the trajectories of the planets generated empirical values
that matched closely with the available astronomical data. However, it also
became clear that when summed to all orders, the expansions diverge.24
This case reveals a potentially serious problem for state-space semantics.
The perturbative calculation yields infinity for the value of a measurable phys-
ical observable and so the semantics regards the theoretical value generated
by the perturbative calculation as false. It does not have the resources to
assign meaningfulness to the empirically adequate early partial sums. But
the problem is actually worse than assigning “false” to the calculations that
demonstrated the empirical adequacy of the theory: an argument can be
made that it actually treats such calculations as meaningless. Recall that
divergent perturbation series do not uniquely correspond to a function. Even
when a series can be shown to be asymptotic to a function, there are an
infinite collection of other functions to which the series is also asymptotic.
This inhibits interpreting the perturbative expansion as an approximation,
as the object to which it is supposed to be an approximation is indetermi-
nate. Put simply, the problem for state-space semantics is that it renders the
statements that express the empirical adequacy of the theory as at best false,
and at worst meaningless. There is, however, an escape option available to
the defender of state-space semantics that is very much worth considering. In
particular, if the relevant perturbative expansions could be shown to satisfy
the strong asymptotic condition and be uniquely associated with a function,
the interpretation as an approximation would once again become viable.25
use for actual use in comparing with empirical data.
24The second volume of Poincare´’s The New Methods of Celestial Mechanics is largely
a collection of theorems establishing the divergence of all of the different perturbative
methods in use at the time (Poincare´ 1993). In fact, this analysis led Poincare´ to develop
the notion of asymptoticity introduced in the previous section.
25Unfortunately, the strong asymptotic condition was not developed until long after the
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An example from non-relativistic quantum mechanics serves to illustrate
how this escape option for the state-space semanticist might proceed. The
state-space of non-relativistic quantum mechanics is a Hilbert space, and the
dynamics of the theory is given by the Schro¨dinger equation,
i~
∂Ψ
∂t
= HΨ,
where H is the Hamiltonian. The physically measurable quantities described
by the theory are represented by Hermitian operators on the Hilbert space
in which the wavefunction, Ψ, is defined. The U(m, r, t) are thus sentences
assigning a particular eigenvalue r to a particular Hermitian operator m at
particular time. The satisfaction function h(U) assigns “true” to the collec-
tion of states yielding the correct eigenvalue for the operator, and “false” to
the others. As in the classical case, this semantics can be straightforwardly
applied when exact solutions to the Schro¨dinger equation are available.
The difficulties for state-space semantics arise when exact solutions are not
available and appeal must be made to perturbation theory to gain information
about systems of interest. An interesting example is provided by the Stark
effect which describes the splitting of atomic energy levels in the presence of
an external electric field. It is described naturally by the standard formalism
for non-relativistic quantum mechanics, with the Hamiltonian H = −∆ −
Z/r + 2Fx3, where
∆ =
∂2
∂x21
+
∂2
∂x22
+
∂2
∂x23
, r = (x21 + x
2
2 + x
2
3)
1/2,
Z is the atomic number, and F defines the strength of the field along the x3
direction. The problem can be treated as a perturbation around the exact
solution for the case where the external field is zero. Calculation of the first
few orders of perturbation theory yields close agreement with the experimen-
tally observed splittings in atomic spectra. The measurement of this effect
played an important role in motivating the transition from the old quantum
theory to its modern formulation.26 But just as in the previous cases I have
discussed in this article, it can be shown that when summed to all orders
the perturbative expansions that provide empirical success at low orders ul-
timately diverge. State-space semantics thus seems to face the same problem
in this case as it did in the case of three-body classical gravitating systems.
period during which celestial mechanics was developed, and as a consequence the Borel
summability of the relevant expansions remain, to my knowledge, unchecked.
26The role of the Stark effect in the history of this transition is recounted in detail in
(Duncan and Janssen 2014).
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That is, the statements that express the empirical success of the theory come
out as either false or meaningless with respect to the semantics. What dif-
ferentiates this case from the previous one is that perturbation theory for
eigenvalues of the Stark effect Hamiltonian have been rigorously shown to
satisfy the strong asymptotic condition. They can be Borel summed and
uniquely associated with an exact value.27 As noted above, this restores the
viability of treating the empirically successful truncations as approximations
to the exact eigenvalues. On this view, the existence of the exact eigenvalues
underwrites the physical meaningfulness of the perturbative calculation.
The analysis of this section shows that state-space semantics is well-suited
for capturing truth conditions for statements expressing the empirical con-
tent of a theory in some circumstances. Specifically, it is completely adequate
when the structure specification of the theory conforms to the norms of struc-
ture specification insisted upon by Ruetsche’s standard interpreter. However,
when structure is specified perturbatively I have argued that the status of
state-space semantics requires careful scrutiny. Analysis of the case of the
Stark effect raises the hope that all perturbative expansions that generate
empirical success satisfy the strong asymptotic condition. If this were the
case, then the success resulting from the truncation of divergent series would
always be underwritten by an exact model which the truncation approxi-
mates.
Unfortunately, this hope is dashed in the case of empirically adequate
models of quantum field theory.28 The cause of the failure of Borel summa-
bility in quantum field theory is the presence of singularities in the Borel
transform due to instantons and renormalons.29 These singularities result
from Feynman graphs which produce growth in the amplitude proportional
to n! for n the order of perturbation theory. The presence of such singular-
ities on the positive real axis of the Borel transform inhibits the integration
required to Borel sum a divergent asymptotic series.30 The retreat to treating
truncations of perturbative expansions as approximations is thus not available
in empirically adequate models of quantum field theory. This means that the
calculations that establish the empirical adequacy of quantum electrodynam-
ics, such as the determination of ae, cannot be treated as approximations.
27Borel summability was originally shown in (Graffi and Grecchi 1978). Additional discus-
sion and references can be found in (Simon 1982).
28For discussion see (Duncan 2012). He explains that “. . . the property of Borel summa-
bility is an extremely fragile one, and one which we can hardly ever expect to be present
in interesting relativistic field theories” (Duncan 2012, p. 403).
29Detailed discussion of the significance of these singularities for the problem of structure
specification is provided in (Miller 2016b).
30Preliminary investigation of simplified models of string theory suggest that the situation
is similar in that context (Pasquetti and Schiappa 2010).
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Accounting for their success requires departure from standard accounts of
how mathematical structure underwrites physical meaning.
4. State-space semantics for divergent perturbation theory. The
task of interpreting quantum field theory has been thought to be especially
difficult because in its empirically adequate formulation, the norms of struc-
ture specification accepted by standard interpreters are not satisfied. Halvor-
son explains that:
...philosophers of physics have taken their object of study to be
theories, where theories correspond to mathematical objects (per-
haps sets of models). But it is not so clear where “quantum field
theory” can be located in the mathematical universe. In the ab-
sence of some sort of mathematically intelligible description of
QFT, the philosopher of physics has two options: either find a
new way to understand the task of interpretation, or remain silent
about the interpretation of quantum field theory. (Halvorson and
Muger 2006, pp. 731-732)
In Halvorson’s view, the only available mathematically intelligible character-
ization of the structure of quantum field theory is provided by axiomatiza-
tion. The particular axiomatization that he prefers enjoys the property that
its models satisfy the norms of structure specification accepted by standard
interpreters. However, the models that generate empirical success when char-
acterized perturbatively have not been shown to satisfy the axioms. If one
wants to interpret these perturbatively characterized empirically adequate
models, one must depart from standard approaches to interpretation. A sim-
ilar sentiment is expressed by Ruetsche:
Given a theory T , . . . we confront the exemplary interpretive ques-
tion of how exactly to establish a correspondence between T ’s
models and worlds possible according to T . That is, we con-
front that question if T is the sort of thing that has models. ‘A
collection of partially heuristic technical developments’ isn’t read-
ily attributed a set of models about whose underlying ontology
or principles of individuation philosophical questions immediately
arise. This isn’t to say that ‘a collection of partially heuristic
technical developments’ is unworthy of philosophical attention. It
is in itself a philosophically provocative circumstance that such a
collection can enjoy stunning empirical success.31 (Ruetsche 2011,
31The characterization of perturbative field theory as “a collection of partially heuristic
technical developments” is a reference to a remark of Segal aimed at motivating axiomatic
approaches to the theory (Segal 1959, p. 341).
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p. 102-103)
The remarks of both Halvorson and Ruetsche amount to insistence that struc-
ture specification meets the norms of standard interpreters.32 Pace Halvorson
and Ruetsche, in my view an adequate approach to interpretation must show
how a theory’s expression of physical content underwrites its stunning empiri-
cal success. The interpretation of physical theories is of philosophical interest
because it informs our understanding of the actual world, not possible worlds
that differ essentially from our own. That standard approaches to interpre-
tation are unable to accommodate this success is a sign of their inadequacy
for establishing how physical meaning attaches to mathematical structure.
There is a response available to defenders of standard interpretation: they
can attribute the empirical success of perturbative field theory to the exis-
tence of an exact mathematical structure to which we simply do not currently
have access. One might reasonably hope to gain access to such a structure
in one of the following ways. First, it could turn out that additional work
by constructive field theorists will show empirically adequate perturbatively
characterized models to satisfy an existing axiomatization of quantum field
theory. There exists evidence that they do not, but none of it is definitive
and so this remains an open possibility. Alternatively, a new axiomatization
of quantum field theory could be developed and empirically adequate models
could be shown to exactly satisfy this new axiomatization.33 For standard
interpreters, showing that quantum field theory underwrites the greatest em-
pirical successes ever achieved with a physical theory is predicated on the
hope that such a structure will be discovered.
The argument of the previous section lays the foundation for a departure
from standard interpretation according to which physical meaning can be
associated with empirically successful perturbatively characterized models,
without appealing to hoped for exact mathematical structures. Pursuing this
alternative approach requires first recognizing that perturbatively character-
ized models are entirely mathematically intelligible, and are not merely “a
collection of partially heuristic technical developments.” The formalism for
perturbative evaluation is subject to a number of well-known mathematical
problems that have led to pessimism about its mathematical meaningfulness.
These problems including infrared and ultraviolet divergences, which ren-
der individual orders of perturbation theory infinite. However, it is essential
32A similar perspective has also been articulated by Fraser in (Fraser 2009; Fraser 2011).
33Realizing either of these possibilities would likely amount to solving the Clay Mathemat-
ics Institute Millenium Problem on quantum Yang-Mills theory with a mass gap. The
problem is stated in (Jaffe and Witten 2000), and additional discussion can be found in
(Douglas 2004).
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to note that for renormalizable theories like quantum electrodynamics, per-
turbative renormalization theory provides a conceptually clear and physically
motivated procedure for rendering every individual order of perturbation the-
ory finite.34 Furthermore, the output of this procedure is a mathematically
well-defined formal power series which one can attempt to sum.35 The con-
vergence properties of the series when summed to all orders are thus the only
legitimate challenge to the structure specification of perturbatively charac-
terized models.36
Accounting for how mathematical structure holds empirical content in
face of large-order divergences that are not Borel summable requires depar-
ture from the norms of structure specification accepted by standard inter-
preters. In my view, divergent perturbation theory provides a novel connec-
tion between mathematical structure and physical meaning that should be
incorporated into the semantics of a theory.37 State-space semantics can be
modified in a way that captures this novel connection. The new semantics
retains the core aspects of state-space semantics. The role of the state-space
and the elementary physical statements remain unchanged. Modifications are
only required for the definition of the satisfaction function.
The first observation at the heart of the modification is that van Fraassen’s
articulation of state-space semantics relies on an unrealistic characterization
of measurements.38 Actual measurements never determine the exact value of
a quantity. Agreement between theory and experiment instead takes the form
of comparisons of a theoretically determined value, r, and an experimentally
34For discussion of infrared divergences and how they are related to the problem of structure
specification see (Earman and Fraser 2006) and (Miller 2016a). Ultraviolet divergences
are addressed in (Wallace 2006), (Wallace 2011), (Williams 2016), and (Fraser 2016).
The approach of Wallace, Williams, and Fraser resolves the problem of ultraviolet diver-
gences by treating empirically adequate field theories as effective theories whose empirical
content is confined to a limited scale. I develop an approach to resolving the problem for
structure specification raised by ultraviolet divergences in a manner which is compatible
with an effective field theory interpretation, but which does not require one, in (Miller
2016c).
35If the reader doubts this claim I encourage them to consult (Wightman 1986).
36Note that I am not claiming that all calculations found in the physics literature on
quantum field theory are rigorous. The claim is that there is a subset of such calculations
that suffice to run my argument that can be made rigorous.
37A number of other authors have recently called into question standard assumptions about
how physical content accrues to mathematical structure (Curiel 2011; Ruetsche 2011;
Wilson 2006). The departures from standard interpretation that they argue for are not
directly connected to the one I advocate in this article, however.
38I believe van Fraassen would agree. He explains that “The exact relation between
U(m; r; t) and the outcome of an actual experiment is the subject of an auxiliary theory
of measurement, of which the notion of ‘correspondence rule’ gives only the shallowest
characterization (van Fraassen 1970, p. 329).”
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determined value, r¯, with some associated measurement error m. Theoret-
ically determined values are empirically adequate not just when r = r¯, but
when r ∈ (r¯− m, r¯+ m). The first required modification to the semantics is
to redefine the satisfaction function so that it returns “true” not just when
r = r¯, but also when r ∈ (r¯ − m, r¯ + m).
The core issue for state-space semantics raised by the divergence of per-
turbation theory concerns the role of the theoretically determined value in
the semantics. The nature of the modification to the measured value sug-
gests that there is some freedom in the theoretical values that are compatible
with measurement results. This freedom can be exploited to provide a new
semantics that adequately captures the empirical success of truncations of
perturbative expansions that are convergent, strongly asymptotic, and even
those that are not Borel summable. The details are different for each case,
but the central idea is to provide a well-defined bound on the error introduced
by truncating the expansion, t. If that bound can be shown to be compatible
with the freedom resulting from the presence of the measurement error, m,
the truncation error can be seamlessly incorporated into the semantics.
For convergent and strongly asymptotic series, finding such a principled
bound is typically straightforward. In the case of convergent Taylor series for
example, the relevant bounds can be provided by results related to Taylor’s
theorem. Consider the Taylor series of f(x) about the point a,
∑∞
n=0 cn(x−a)n
for cn = f
(n)/n!. If |f (n+1)(x)| ≤M for all x ∈ (a− r, a+ r) with some r > 0,
then the error from truncation at the Nth term, f(x) −∑Nn=0 cn(x − a)n ≡
RN(x), is bounded by
|RN(x)| ≤M |x− a|
N+1
(N + 1)!
.
The truncation error, t, can be taken to be,
t = M
|x− a|N+1
(N + 1)!
.
Similarly, it has already been noted in the Section Two that for a series that
is strongly asymptotic to a function in the sector S, there exist C and σ such
that, ∣∣∣∣∣f(z)−
N∑
n=0
anz
n
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ CσN+1(N + 1)!|z|N+1,
for all N and z ∈ S. In this case we can take,
t = Cσ
N+1(N + 1)!|z|N+1.
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There are also principled methods for assigning error bounds to truncations
of divergent asymptotic expansions that are not Borel summable. Suppose
f(x) ∼ ∑∞n=0 anxn. The optimal truncation rule dictates that the series
should be truncated at the smallest term of the series, Nmin, so that the
value of the truncation is
∑Nmin
n=0 anx
n. This rule is justified by the fact that
the minimal error is typically achieved with this truncation. Moreover, the
error is typically bounded by the magnitude of the value of the least term,
|f(x)−∑Nminn=0 anxn| ≤ |aNminxNmin |. The caveat “typically” is important, and
both properties must be rigorously confirmed for each individual case. But
in those situations where they can be confirmed we can take,
t = aNminx
Nmin .
These rigorously established bounds on the truncation error provide the
critical ingredient to complete the modified semantics. The satisfaction func-
tion must be redefined so that in addition to accounting for the measurement
error, it is also ensured that the truncation error is not greater than the free-
dom allowed in the theoretical value by the measurement error. This is the
case when (r − t, r + t) ⊂ (r¯ − m, r¯ + m). The satisfaction function thus
needs to be redefined so that the U(m, r, t) are true when (r − t, r + t) ⊂
(r¯ − m, r¯ + m) and false otherwise. A new feature of the view is that the
empirical content of a theory can come with precisely defined, but limited
precision.
A number of remarks are in order. In the previous section I argued that
truncations of convergent and strongly asymptotic expansions can be inter-
preted as approximations. When this approach is taken, all of the physical
meaning derives from the exact model, and the truncation simply approxi-
mates the exact value. But, the proposal of this section makes it clear that
it is not necessary to view such truncations as approximations. On the alter-
native view developed here, convergent and strongly asymptotic expansions
are not interpreted as approximations. They are to be interpreted in just
the same way as truncations of series that are not Borel summable for which
the interpretation as an approximation is not available. It is these limited
precision comparisons to experiments that convinced physicists of the truth
of the theory in each of the cases introduced above. For this reason I believe
this is the best way to capture the semantics of divergent perturbation theory,
even in cases where Borel summability is retroactively established. Another
important thing to note is that nothing about this proposed modification to
state-space semantics involves a lack of mathematical rigor. When the bounds
used for t are established by the means discussed above, their existence is
proved by the standards of rigor accepted by mathematicians.
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The most important advantage of this proposal is that it allows us to
treat the most empirically successful theories as providing meaningful claims
about the world. Moreover, it does so by making minimal, and, in my view,
natural modifications to an approach to interpretation that exemplifies the
core commitments of standard interpretation. The modifications are minimal
as all that is involved is a redefinition of the satisfaction function. They are
natural in the sense that the modification that is made is directly motivated by
the nature of the empirical support for the theory being interpreted. Rather
than adhering to philosophical commitments about how theories ought to hold
physical meaning in their mathematical expression, the account captures how
they actually do hold empirical content in physical practice.
There are two counterintuitive consequences of the modified state-space
semantics that I have developed in this section which must be weighed against
the advantages just articulated. The first is explained in the following remark
of Magnen and Rivasseau:
Constructive field theory builds functions whose Taylor expan-
sion is perturbative field theory. Any formal power series being
asymptotic to infinitely many smooth functions, perturbative field
theory alone does not give any well defined mathematical recipe
to compute to arbitrary accuracy any physical number, so in a
deep sense it is no theory at all. (Magnen and Rivasseau 2008, p.
403)
Perturbative field theory is not a theory in the sense that it cannot be given a
state-space semantics, or any interpretation that requires that there be phys-
ical facts of the matter about the exact value of physical observables. On
my view, the empirical content of the theory simply has a limited, but rigor-
ously established, precision. This is counterintuitive, but I think it is worth
asking why we default to the assumption that there is a physical fact of the
matter about the trillionth decimal place of physical observables, let alone
the 101000th decimal place. I am not aware of any physical observable for
which there are empirical grounds for commitment to this level of precision.
Defenders of standard interpretation owe an explanation for their tacit com-
mitment to this view, and it should be one based on something other than
philosophical preconceptions about the structure of scientific theories.
The second counterintuitive consequence is that the truth values vary
with experimental precision. The modified satisfaction function requires that
(r − t, r + t) ⊂ (r¯ − m, r¯ + m), and over the course of time, m can be
made smaller with improvements in experimental techniques. This points
to another important difference between convergent and divergent expan-
sions. For convergent expansions, t can always be made arbitrarily small by
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summing additional orders of perturbation theory. This is not the case for
divergent asymptotic expansions, whether they are strongly asymptotic to a
function or not. Asymptoticity and strong asymptoticity only assure that the
error induced by truncation at a particular order is small, and there is some
order for which this error is minimized. If the measurement error is eventu-
ally reduced beyond this minimum truncation error, on my view the theory
no longer expresses the empirical content of the theory sufficiently precisely
to be confirmed by experiments. I am not aware of any case in actual phys-
ical practice where this possibility has been realized, but such a case would
certainly warrant careful analysis. While both of these counterintuitive con-
sequences merit further discussion, I believe the advantages of the modified
semantics developed here outweigh any negative considerations they bring to
bear on my view.
5. Conclusion. Consider once more Abel’s question: why do truncations
of perturbative expansions generate empirically adequate values? Defenders
of standard interpretation naturally resort to treating truncations as approx-
imations to exact models. However, this route is not available in cases where
perturbation theory is not Borel summable. To account for the empirical
success of quantum electrodynamics, for example, they have no choice but to
wait for some new exact structure to underwrite the success of calculations
of observables like ae. If the norms of structure specification accepted by
standard interpreters are to be met, this is the only option.
I have offered an alternative approach to answering Abel’s question. On
my view, perturbation theory presents a genuinely novel connection between
mathematical structure and physical meaning. By incorporating this con-
nection directly into the semantics for physical theories, we can meaningfully
account for the empirical successes of quantum field theory. Rather than
hoped-for structure, I have advocated that we look to the methodologies used
in physical practice. In one sense this is conservative. The modification to
state-space semantics that I advocate is minimal in the sense that it preserves
most of the features of the view as expressed by van Fraassen. It is natural
in the sense that the modifications to state-space semantics are motivated by
the nature of the empirical support for the theory in question. But in another
sense it is radical. It requires that we accept that expressions of the empirical
content of physical theories can have in principle limits on their precision,
and that the truth values of statements expressing that empirical content
might vary with the precision of measurements. In my view, the benefits of
having a firm sense of how theories as we actually have them make contact
with the world far outweigh the luxury of rigidly maintaining philosophical
commitments about the structure of theories.
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